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Introduction
There has been a growing interest in the question of corporate governance. Corporate frauds at Enron and Worldcom, trading abuses in the mutual fund industry, and conflicts of interest between analysts and investment bankers have fueled interest in civil and criminal remedies to better protect the interests of investors.
This paper is a case study of the actions of a major participant in each of the three areas mentioned: Citigroup. Citigroup is a global financial colossus with a December 2005 market capitalization of almost $250 billion, 2004 earnings of almost $17 billion, 287, 000 employees, and almost $1.5 trillion dollars in assets. 1 Citi's sheer size, business ties to Enron and Worldcom, major presence in the mutual fund business through Salomon Smith Barney, and $21.7 billion dollars in global investment banking revenues 2 make it a prime candidate for our study. This paper seeks to determine whether and when government oversight effects the real bottom line: the company's stock price. Through this case study, we hope to determine if the stock price reacts when cases are announced or when they are settled. If the former, we also seek to answer the question of whether the market correctly anticipated the scale and scope of fines and civil penalties paid by the company. 
Related Literature
The literature has typically found that the company stock reacts negatively to the announcement of private litigation. Prince and Rubin (2002) found that in the automobile and pharmaceutical industries, the firm suffered significant negative returns surrounding the announcement of lawsuits.
Ferris and Pritchard (2001) found negative stock price reactions following the announcement of fraud litigations. Griffin, Grunfest and Perino (2003) also found that the stock reacted negatively to the notification of the security fraud litigation, with effects that persist for several weeks.
The date of settlement seems to provide little news to the market. Ferris and Pritchard (2001) found no statistically significant impact on stock returns once cases are settled.
It is worth noting that none of the cases we examine went to trial. This seems consistent with Karpoff and Lott (1999) who note that pre-trial settlements are generally smaller than the damages awards by a jury.
Prince and Rubin also looked at the question of how well the stock market predicted the costs of litigation. They found that the losses on the firm value were approximately equal to the upper bound of the direct losses causes by the defective products.
Identifying News Events
We researched Citigroup's litigation troubles using Lexis-Nexis in the "Business News" category.
Our sources were under the heading "Business and Finance. Our keywords were, under "headline, lead paragraph," "Citigroup" and either "probe" or "subpoena. [INSERT Table 1 HERE] We filtered these results further to isolate the first mention of a government action and dropped cases against individuals rather than the company. There are 24 events that met our criteria after this final filtering which we grouped into 6 categories: (A)-(F). Our complete list is in Table 1 . We look at the cases next from the perspective of the agency conducting the investigation.
Open cases

Enforcement Agents
The lead actor in a U.S. enforcement action is typically the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). This period was unusual because of the lead role played by state authorities, in this case the New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer. The SEC does not undertake criminal actions, leaving this to the Justice Department and on occasion to state prosecutors. The SEC imposes civil penalties both as a deterrent, and to make restitution to victims. The NYSE and NASD are self-regulatory organizations (SROs) that have the ability to impose fines and conduct remedies.
SEC
The SEC undertakes many informal and routine inquiries which result in company specific requests for information. Since 1990, it has not needed court permission 5 to pursue a probe. It may also file a Wells Notice 6 to formally indicate that an enforcement action will follow. The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) also uses a similar procedure.
The receipt of a Wells Notice typically does not come as a surprise to the prospective respondent, as there is almost always an investigation and discussions with the SEC or NASD staff prior to a filing. We have record of only two Wells notices in our event groupings, September 10, 2002 in the Enron case, and the mutual fund case of July 20, 2004.
The SEC is the lead authority in 9 our of 24 events. The NASD is responsible for one.
New York State authorities
During our sample period, there was an unexpected player in the investigation of Citigroup's illicit activities. New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer made aggressive use of state fraud statutes to launch independent investigations into analysts, mutual fund fraud, and then the insurance business.
Spitzer is responsible for 5 of our news events. The Manhattan district attorney's office pursued a criminal case in the Enron investigation.
Other government investigations
The Enron case was so high profile that the Senate took the unusual step of launching an important investigation as well. On July 23, 2002, they began their probe. On August 13, 2002, they issued a subpoena to Citigroup and a second one at the end of the month. In total, the Congress is the actor in 5 events.
The FTC also became involved in Citigroup's consumer lending practices. Foreign regulators have played the lead role in the U.K. bond trading scandal and the Parmalat investigation.
We now turn to the question of when and if these announcements impacted Citigroup's stock price.
The Model
We look at the four year period from [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] and test the hypothesis that announcements and/or settlements effect the stock price. Prince and Rubin (2002) and Garber and Adams (1998) argue that investors may have already incorporated expected losses into the stock prices before the settlements, providing little "element of surprise." Alternatively, punitive damages could result in a negative stock return on the settlement day. Karpoff and Lott (1999) found that a current punitive damage award could induce the market to revise up their expected losses for ongoing litigation.
An argument for a positive effect could be due to the litigation reserve. A smaller than expected award could raise earnings by releasing the reserve into future earnings streams.
We now test these alternative explanations in a simple event study model. r i,t is the return for Citigroup stock on the day t, r m,t is the market rate of return and, DN ews and DSettle are dummy variables for the news release, and the settlement date, r i,t − r m,t = a 0 + a 1 DN ews i,t + a 2 DSettle i,t + ε i,t .
(1)
Our data on returns is from the CRSP database. The market return is the value-weighted return for the entire market. Table 1 reports the excess returns on the 24 event dates.
Our estimates confirmed a significantly negative reaction for our key event days on the abnormal stock returns. t-ratios are in parentheses.
r i,t − r m,t = 0.0631
These estimates indicate that Citigroup had an average −1.70% negative excess return on the days of our 24 announcements.
We also found a smaller, negative, but statistically insignificant stock reaction on the event days of the settlements. It appears that Citigroup was fairly accurate in establishing its' litigation reserve. We now turn to see if the market was equally accurate.
Efficiency of Market Discipline
Economists have long argued that the market imposes the ultimate discipline on corporate malfeasance. We ask in this section whether or not the market rationally anticipates the outcome of the six major event groups. A complete list of the market cap changes in the six case groupings is in Table 2 along with settlement dates and amounts.
[INSERT Table 2 HERE] We accumulate the change in market cap following each news event, and use it to explain the size of the eventual settlement,
n j is the number of information events about case j.
In our six major cases groupings, we estimate
This model fits the data reasonably well with an R 2 of 34% although the market cap change is only marginally significant. This equation says the market punishes the company almost $160.41
for every dollar that the government recovers. 
The fit is now remarkably good with an R 2 of 99%, and the market cap is overwhelmingly significant.
(5) implies the market predicted a $3.073 billion settlement for Worldcom (actual $3.055 billion) and $2.085 billion for Enron (actual $2.120 billion).
Each dollar change in market cap in (5) now predicts $11.99 in government and private litigation losses. This is close to Citigroup's December 2005 trailing price earnings ratio of 11.14.
Conclusion
In ongoing research, we are examining whether these results for Citigroup will generalize to the rest of the financial sector, and to other industries as well. Bajaj, Mazumdar and Sarin (2003) showed that the losses of firm value during the litigation period were much larger than the settlement amount. Prince and Rubin (2002) noted that it is common for negative stock returns to exceed expected damage payments. They argue that firms suffer reputation costs. They conjecture that private litigation is less harmful to a firm's reputation than government sanctions.
In the language of finance, this suggests that firms that are continually cited by the SEC and other enforcement agents may have lower price earnings ratios. We leave this interesting question to future research.
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